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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to observe the association
between inter-part}7 competition and the campaign strategies employed
by various Congressional candidates. The hypothesis is that candidates
in competitive districts conduct more "rational" campaign strategies
than candidates from noncompetitive districts. A campaign strategy
is considered "rational" if the candidate: makes group appeals,
emphasizes policy and constituency issues rather than ideological
and personal ones; concentrates his time and efforts in areas of
strength rather than weakness; engages in as much personal contact
as possible; employs a simple, recognizable campaign theme; emphasizes
his party affiliation if from the majority party and emphasizes his
personal characteristics if from the minority party; and attempts
to increase the voter turnout if a nonincumbent.
The campaigns in four Congressional districts in Virginia
were observed during the 1972 election campaign. The data for the
study came from direct interviews with the eight candidates in the
four races. An index of inter-party competition was prepared and
the candidate's responses were related to the amount of party
competition in each district.
The results of the investigation confirmed the hypothesis.
In this setting, candidates from competitive districts did employ
more "rational" campaign strategies than candidates from noncompetitive
districts.

CAMPAIGN STRATEGY:

THE IMPACT

INTER-PARTY COMPETITION

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This study Is concerned with the relationship between the
amount of competition in campaigns and various features of campaign
strategy.

Beginning with Key, political scientists have argued that

parties facing competition are likely to have the most centralized
control of nominations, and the greatest cohesion in state legisla
tures and in gubernatorial-legislative relations.

And, as a result,

they are likely to be the most effective and responsive governing
agencies,^

By now it is a common assumption among students of

American politics that political leaders in a competitive two-party
system are more responsive to the popular will ". . . not so much out
2
of principle as out of fear of retribution at the polls.1'

To the

extent that this assumption is correct, competitive elections are a
basic feature of democracy, if that word is interpreted to mean
popular control of political decision making.
One reason that competitive elections are thought to be such
a basic aspect of popular control is that they produce what ma}? be

■^V. 0. Key, Southern Politics (New York: Vintage Books,
1949), ch. 14; V. 0. Key, American State Politics: An Introduction
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 201; Robert Golembiewski,
"A Taxonomic Approach-to State Political Party Strength," Western
Political Quarterly, XL (1958), 494-513.
2

Duane Lockhard, New England State Politics (Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 327.
2

called "rational" campaigns; that is, campaigns which educate the
public, which illuminate public issues and provide realistic policy
alternatives, and which provide an opportunity for the indication of
majority preference.

Whether or not competitive campaigns actually

promote rational strategies, however, is a question not carefully
investigated in the literature of the field to this time.

The purpos

of this paper is preliminary inquiry which may fill in that gap some
what .
This paper examines the general idea that the amount of inter
party competition affects key decisions made by candidates concerning
their campaign strategies.

Its thesis is that candidates in

competitive campaigns are likely to employ campaign strategies that
may be considered "rational," while candidates in noncompetitive
races do not.

They will be called "rational" campaign strategies

here if they are strategies aimed at acquiring as many votes as
possible.
The acquisition of as many votes as possible is assumed here
to be the major objective of campaigns.

A simple majority of the

vote is enough to win an election, of course; indeed, in many races
involving more than two candidates, less than a majority will be
sufficient.

Nonetheless, most candidates probably seek to obtain

as many votes as possible, and not merely a majority.
reasons for this.

There are many

One, the most obvious, perhaps, is that candidates

have no way of judging their campaigning productivity accurately, so
as to spend just enough energy, money, and other resources to produce
a majority.

Accordingly, the temptation is to spend as much as is

4

available, rather than an amount designed to produce a carefully gauged
winning vote.

In some cases, a candidate's ambition is to seek higher

office beyond the present election, and, hence, his aim is not merely
to win, but also to demonstrate an overwhelming vote-getting ability.
In others, a candidate's hope may be to win by so large a margin as
to reduce the chances of opposition at some future election.

In all

of these cases, candidates who hope to win try to do so by winning as
many votes as possible, and not just a majority.
All candidates, however, do not actually hope to win.

Some

who have no hope of winning the election may run for entirely different
purposes, such as gaining a reputation, or promoting some cherished
cause.

Even in such cases, however, it may be assumed that the

candidate's objective is to win as many votes as possible.

If a

candidate's purpose in running for office is to increase his private
business, the more votes he gets (even though losing), the greater the
benefit to his business, one may assume.

If the purpose is to give

notoriety to some unpopular or little-known cause, the same is true.
In virtually all cases, then, it is reasonable to assume that the
single objective of all electoral campaigns is to win as many votes
as possible.
An action or a decision is considered rational ", . . to the
extent that it is correctly designed to maximize goal achievement."
Thus, if the goal of a campaign is considered to be that of winning

3
Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, Politics, Ecnomics,
and Welfare (New York: Harper, 1953), p. 38.

3

as many votes as possible, then what could be called a "rational
campaign strategy" is one that has been determined by the experience
of other candidates to be most effective in winning votes.

The

hypothesis of this paper is that candidates in competitive districts
are more inclined to employ rational campaign strategies than are
candidates in noncompetitive districts in that they:
1.

make appeals to major groups in the electorate;

2.

emphasize policy and constituency issues rather

than

ideological and personal ones;
3.

concentrate their time and efforts in areas of

strength rather than weakness;
4.

engage in more personal contact;

5.

employ a simple, recognizable theme;

6.

emphasize their party affiliation if they are from

the majority party and emphasize their personal characteristics if
they are from the minority party; and
7.
nonincumbent

4

make a greater effort to increase the turnout if a

4

These strategic points are taken from various books that
have been written on the subject of campaign strategy and tactics;
especially see, Lewis Froman, "A Realistic Approach to Campaign
Strategies and Tactics," in The Electoral Process, ed. by Kent
Jennings and Harmon Zeigler (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Ilal 1, Inc., 1966); John Kessel, "A Game Theory Analysis
of Campaign Strategy," in The Electoral Process, e d . by Kent Jennings
and Harmon Zeigler (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc
1966); John Kingdon, Candidates for Office (New York: Random House,
1968); Nelson Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky, Presidential Elections
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971); David Leuthold,
Electioneering in a Democracy (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.,
1968); Conrad Joyner, chapter in Practical Politics in the United

6

The argument, is that candidates in competitive districts are forced
to utilize these proven effective strategies; whereas in noncompeti
tive districts, because of the certainty of the outcome, both the
winning and losing candidates can afford to waste resources in
"nonrational" ways.
In order to pursue this research problem, it will be necessary .
first of all to identify very clearly what the elements of a "rational"
campaign strategy are.
foil ows.

This will be the burden of Chapter II, which

Chapter III, in turn, will deal with methods of the study,

describing the design of the research project, the method used for
measuring inter-party competition, and the setting in which the
field research was carried out.

The results of the study are presented

in Chapter IV, leading to the conclusion that competitive contests do
indeed promote the use of rational campaign strategies.

The final

chapter contains a summary of the findings, and a discussion of their
significance.

States, ed. by Cornelius Cotter (Boston, Massachusetts: Allyn and
Bacon, 1969); Murray Levin, The Complete Politician (New York:
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1962); Dan Nimmo, The Political
Persuaders (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Ilal1, Inc.,
1970)'.

CHAPTER II

RATIONAL CAMPAIGN STRATEGY:

A DEFINITION

Politicians have long believed that their behavior daring
election campaigns could determine their success or failure on
election day.“* Numerous cases are cited in which candidates have
campaigned vigorously against heavy odds and managed to win; and,
also, cases in which overconfident candidates took the campaign
too lightly and were upset.

Nixon is an example:

he believes

that his performance during the 1960 campaign period cost him
the Presidency in 1960.^
There is evidence that campaigns actually have relatively
little effect on voting behavior.

7

Political scientists have found

that the factor most consistently related to voting decisions is
the party identification of the voter, and also that most of the
electorate decide on whom to support prior to the campaign.

8

Nonetheless, campaigns may be seen to be an important part of the

^Dan Nimmo, The Political Persuaders (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 1.
^Richard Nixon, Six Crises (New York:
1962), ch. 6.

Pocket Books, Inc.,

7
Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfield, and William McPhee,
Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 132-37.
g

Nimmo, The Political Persuaders, p. 3.

7

8

American political process:
The American political campaign is the means through which the
public leaves its mark on the governmental process and through
which a broad consensus is reached. It opens the way to the only
truly accurate poll of the voters' political mood and desires. It
requires the stewards of power to account for their activities and
permits those who seek to replace them to challenge that accounting
And campaigns, whatever the intent of the candidates, usually do
exercise an educational i n f l u e n c e . ^
This chapter examines what others have written about the ele
ments of campaign strategy, in an effort to devise a working definition
of a "rational" campaign, a necessary basis from which to devise the
theory which guides this study.

It begins with the writer’s definition

of a "rational campaign strategy" and then goes on to discuss each of
the several aspects of campaign strategy which are thought to be
associated with campaigns, and, hence, might be considered in the
formulation of a definition of rational campaigning.

A.

Definition of Rational
C amp ai gn Stra tegv
As mentioned in Chapter I, a "rational campaign strategy" is

one that has been determined by the experience of other candidates
to be most effective in winning votes.

By examining what has been

written previously about campaign strategy, the writer has chosen
seven elements of campaigning that appear to have been most effective
in winning votes in the past.

For purposes of this research, a

campaign strategy will be considered rational if the candidate abides

9
American Institute for Political Communication, The New
Methodology: A Study of Political Strategy and Tactics (Washington,
D. C.: American Institute for Political Communication, 1967),
Introduction.

9

by the following rules:
1.

Group appeals.

The candidate must appeal to groups,

rather than to undifferentiated masses of people.
2.

Area concentration.

The candidate must concentrate

his time and efforts in areas of strength rather than weakness.
3.

Issue emphasis.

The candidate must stress policy and

constituency issues rather than ideological and personal issues.
4.

Personal contact.

The candidate must engage in as

much personal contact as possible.
5.

Theme.

The candidate must employ a simple,

recognizable campaign theme.
6.

Party-personality.

The candidate must emphasize his

party affiliation if from the majority party and emphasize his
personal characteristics if from the minority party.
7.

Voter turnout.

The candidate, if a nonincumbent, must

attempt to increase the voter turnout.
Each of these elements is considered in the following discussion.

B.

Group Appeals
It is difficult to speak about campaigns in general because of

the many variations that are likely to exist.^

However, there are

certain features that appear to be common to most campaigns.

One of

these is that most candidates attempt to develop group support.

Charles Jones, "A Suggested Scheme for Classifying
Congressional Campaigns,11 Public Opinion Quarterly, Spring, 1962,
pp. 126-32.

One

10

way of viewing the electorate is that it is composed of a large number
of groups and associations.

Therefore, candidates often attempt to

build a coalition of supporting groups which would be sufficient to
elect them.
Froman has written on the subject of campaign strategy and
tactics and states that

. . one of the most important tasks

confronting candidates for public office is the gaining and maintaining of group support."

12

The Survey Research Center at the

University of Michigan has established that the voter's decision
is based in part on his attitude toward the various groups in the
electorate.

]3

These groups can be of many types:

economic, and so on.

political, social,

Studies have indicated that 10 per cent or more

of the members of a group may be affected by the decision of their
leadership to oppose or support a candidate.

14

They have also shown

that even if the leadership does not take a position, group members
may be affected by the fact that one of the candidates is a member of
the group, for example, when Catholics vote more strongly for a
Catholic candidate than they would have voted for a non-Catholic

^Jo h n Kingdom, Candidates for Office (New York:
House, 1968), p. 116.

Random

12

Lewis Froman, "A Realistic Approach to Campaign Strategies
and Tactics," in The Electoral Process, ed. by Kent Jennings and
Harmon Zeigler (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1966) .
13

vTohn

York:

Angus Campbell, et a1 ., The American Voter (New York:
Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960), ch. 10.
"^David Leuthold, Electioneering in a Democracy (New
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968), p. 61.

11

candidate.^
If a candidate can acquire group support, he will have three
of the basic processes of group life working to his a d v a n t a g e . F i r s t ,
groups serve as a means of communication:

through discussions and

conversations, information concerning the candidate can be made
relevant to the concerns of group members.

Second, groups provide

criteria for evaluating and interpreting information so that it is
likely that the group member will come to see the information in a
particular way.

And third, groups act as mechanisms to enforce

conformity among their members.

This conformity can be achieved

because the most effective pressure on people is that of group
17
pressure.
Also, it should be mentioned that groups can provide two of
the most important practical resources needed in a campaign:
and money.

workers

Despite this evidence that group support is beneficial

to candidates, a study by Kingdon of candidates for office in Wisconsin
indicated that nearly one-half of the candidates interviewed replied
that they did not make group appeals.

18

There is also evidence that

candidates do not adhere to another of the elements of the rational
campaign strategy--that of concentrating major efforts in areas of

15

Campbell, et a1 ., The American Voter, pp. 314-21.

^Froman, "A Realistic Approach to Campaign Strategies
and Tactics," p. 4.
^ J . A. C. Brown, Techniques of Persuasion (Baltimore:
Penquin Books, 1968), p. 50.
18

Kingdon, Candidates for Office, p. 116.

12

strength.

C.

Area Concentration
One of the rules of campaigning is that the candidate should

concentrate on areas in which he is thought to be strongest.

19

As

Froman points out, it is much easier to get one's known supporters
to cast a favorable vote than it is to activate latent support or to
change the opposition.

20

Attempting to change the opposition is

difficult because of peoples' predispositions which give rise to
selective exposure, perception, and retention.

This selectivity

induces people to attend mostly to communications that reinforce
already existing beliefs.

21

Thus, it is much easier for a candidate

to communicate with people who are already predisposed to vote for
him.
Campaigning in areas of party strength is also realistic
because of the fact that those people with party identification are
more likely to vote than those without party affiliation.

22

The

evidence, then, indicates that the rational strategy is to campaign
in areas of strength and not weakness.

However, the Kingdon study

19

Conrad Joyner, Chapter in Practical Politics in the
United States, e d . by Cornelius Cotter (Boston, Massachusetts:
Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1969), p. 162.
20

Froman, "A Realistic Approach to Campaign Strategies and
Tactics," p . 7.
21

York:

Joseph Klapper, The Effects of Mass Communication (New
The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961), pp. 19-27.
22

Froman, "A Realistic Approach to Campaign Strategies
and Tactics," pp. 6-7.

13

once again indicates that many candidates do not follow this basic
strategic point:

only one-third of the candidates answered that they

concentrated on areas where they thought they would do well.

D.

23

I ssue Emphasis
What has been defined here as a "rational" campaign strategy

includes the argument that certain types of issues should be stressed.
Four issues can be identified for this purpose:
constituency, and personal.

policy, ideology,

Policy and constituency issues, it will

be argued here, are associated with rational campaigning.

Ideological

and personal issues have not been considered effective in winning
votes and, thus, are not associated with rational campaigning.
There has been some question whether voters actually divide
on the basis of issues at all.

Because voters are so ill-informed

about questions of public policy, it is frequently argued that issues
are of little consequence.

One study of the voters' knowledge of

issues during the 1.958 Congressional elections came to this conclu
sion:

not more than a "chemical trace" of evidence was found that

voters had any detailed information about the policy stands of the
candidates.

24

However, one of the basic works in this field has

established that one of the elements that voters base their decision

23
24

Kingdon, Candidates for Office, p. 119.

Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, "Constituency Influence
in Congress," in New Perspectives on the House of Representatives,
e d . by Robert Peabody and Nelson Polsby (Chicago: Rand McNally and
Company, 196 9), p. 47.

on is the various issues of the campaign.

25

Also, a more recent

study has indicated that voters usually are concerned with a few
specific issues and that these can
26
on electoral choice.”

. . have a considerable impact

In a particular campaign, a critical issue

may have an impact such as was apparently the case with the tax issue
in the 1962 Wisconsin gubernatorial race.

27

In this study it will

be assumed that issues are an important ingredient of the voting
decision.
Policy issues can be important in gaining support from
opinion leaders such as newspaper editors and group leaders.

These

people usually support a candidate because of the candidate’s stand
on various questions of public policy and they could hardly do this
if the candidate did not make evident his views on issues that
kt
t
28
concern public
policy.

The Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan has
established that most of the American electorate is not guided by
ideology in its voting behavior.

29

There is also evidence that even

among the party workers, in this case precinct leaders, less than

25

Campbell, e t a 1 ., Th e Ame ri can Vo ter, pp. 523-38.

26

David Repass, "Issue Salience and Party Choice," American
Political Science Review, June, 1971.
27

Kingdon, Candidates for Office, p. 115.

^ Ib i d ., p . 114 .
29

Campbell, et al., The American Voter, ch. 10.

10 per cent are Ideologically oriented.

A candidate, then, should

run a nonideological campaign, stressing substantive policy issues,
not ideological ones, thus seeking a broad base of support.
The Goldwater campaign of 1964 is generally considered a
good example of an ideological campaign.

If one of the parties runs

a candidate from its outer wing, it tends to leave a vacuum in the
center of the political spectrum which can be filled by the opposing
party without losing any votes from its own side of the spectrum.
The result, as in 1964:

M. . . logically and inexorably, is a

landslide at the polls . . . "

for the opposition.

31

Much of a Congressman’s time is spent in helping his con
stituents with their individual problems, constituent service.

A

recent study indicated that 28 per cent of a member's time and nearly
41 per cent of his staff's time is devoted to serving constituents.

32

This is due in part to the increased impact of government on the daily
lives of people who, therefore, are frequently forced to turn to their
representative for assistance.

For a Congressman ". . . becoming a

legislative expert in a less certain avenue to re-election than other

30

Samuel Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral
Analysis (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1964), p. 303.
31

Phillip Converse, Aage Clausen and Warren Miller,
"Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964- Election," American
Political Science Review, June, 1965, p. 321.
32

John S. Saloma, Congress and the New Politics (Boston,
Massachusetts: Little, Brown and Company, 1969), pp. 184-85.

16

more constituent-oriented activities."

Therefore, a candidate should

emphasize during his campaign what he can do for his constituents
(constituency issues).
It is also argued that a rational candidate should not engage
in personal attacks (personal issues) on his opponent.

One reason

,
34
is simply that it is usually not wise to publicize one s opponent.
There is evidence also that attacks of this sort may have the reverse
of the desired effect.

35

In general, then, the rational campaign strategy would dictate
that candidates stress policy issues and issues of constituent
service and avoid ideological appeals and personal attacks.

Here,

again, not all candidates have seen fit to follow this strategy.
However, a study by Huckshorn and Spencer indicated that candidates
in close contests tended to emphasize policy and constituency
issues far more than those candidates who were sure losers.

E.

36

Personal Contact
Another rule of good campaigning is that the candidate should

meet as many people as possible.

33
(New York:

Personal contact by the candidate

Charles Clapp, The Congressman:
Anchor Books, 1963), p. 58.

His Work as He Sees It

34

Froman, "A Realistic Approach to Campaign Strategies
and Tactics," p. 16.
~^Ibid ., p . 18 .
36
Robert Huckshorn and Robert Spencer, The Politics of
Defeat (Amherst, Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts
Press, 1971), p. 209.

17

makes a ". . . more lasting impression than any other form of solicitation."

37

What politicians have long suspected is now being verified

by social scientists:

the more personal the communication, the more

effective it is likely to be.

38

Congressmen seeking reelection

have indicated that whatever else they do during a campaign they
nearly always emphasize the personal appearance technique.

39

An appealing feature of this tactic is that it costs very
little:

in terms of cash outlay the candidate's time is a very

inexpensive resource.

Also, it helps the candidate to create the

image that he is a man of the people, willing to listen to the
ordinary citizen.

Thus, candidates are willing to shake hands

extensively at shopping centers, go door-to-door, and do other
physically demanding activities just for that element of personal
contact.

The Leuthold study of Congressional candidates in the

San Francisco Bay area found that the candidates agreed that personal
contact was the most successful means of influencing voters.

However,

there was a wide discrepancy among the candidates as to how much
personal contact they actually engaged in during the course of their
campaign.

Candidates in competitive races campaigned among the

electorate over twice as many days as those candidates who were in

Joyner, Practical Politics in the United States, p. 166.
38

Froman, "A Realistic Approach to Campaign Strategies
and Tactics," p. 16.
39

Clapp, The Congressman:

His Work as He Sees I t , p. 429.

noncompetitive races.

F.

Theme
The purpose of a campaign theme

. . is to simplify complex

public issues into brief, clear, recognizable statements to the
advantage of the candidate."

41

A short and simple theme is important

because voters are not likely to be attuned to complicated political
messages and are more apt to remember a brief message.

42

Also, if

the theme is to be used on campaign literature, billboards, and
other advertisements, the requirements of time and space make short
themes a necessity.

In fact, one political scientist considers a

short concise theme to be more important than any particular issue
that may arise during a campaign.

Nimmo states that modern

campaigns are fought not on the issues but on the themes and failure
to have a theme can be very frustrating.

43

Perhaps two of the best

examples of campaign themes working to the advantage of the
candidate occurred in the 1960 and 1968 Presidential campaigns.
John Kennedy's promise to "Get America Moving Again" and Hubert
Humphrey's questioning of whether one could "Trust" his two opponents
are credited with being assets to the respective candidate's

40
41
42
43

Leuthold, Electioneering in a Democracy, pp. 103-07.
Nimmo, The Political Persuaders, p. 54.
Joyner, Practical Politics in the United States, p. 166.
Nimmo, The Political Persuaders, p. 55.
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campaign.

G •

Party-Personality

One factor facing all candidates when determining their
strategies is whether or not their party is the majority party.

The

Survey Research Center has established that part}? identification has
a very profound impact on electoral choice:

that up to 75 per cent

of the electorate simply vote their party loyalties at the polls.

45

It is also evident that the electorate, in part, makes its decision
on an evaluation of the personal attributes of the candidates
Therefore, ". . . the basic strategy for the majority is to emphasize
party appeals and play down personal traits . . . the candidate of the
L\.7
minority, of course, stresses 'the man, not the party. r"

Kessel,

by use of a game theory analysis of the 1960 presidential campaign,
indicated that Nixon from the minority party should have placed the
most emphasis on his own abilities and the least on his party.

On

the other hand, John Kennedy's optimal strategy would have been to
devote the most attention to the Democratic Party and direct less
attention to himself.

48

The John Volpe campaign for Governor of

44

Froman, "A Realistic Approach to Campaign Strategies and
Tactics," p. 16; Theodore White, The Making of the President 1968
(New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1969), pp. 418-19.
45

Campbell, et al., The American Voter, pp. 136-42.

^ I b i d ., p . 54 .
47

Nimmo, The Political Persuaders, pp. 50-51.

A8
John Kessel, "A Game Theory Analysis of Campaign Strategy," in
The Electoral Process, ed. by Kent Jennings and Harmon Zeigler
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), pp. 293-94.
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Massachusetts in 1960 is a case of a candidate from a distinctly
minority party following this strategy and achieving success.
Volpe campaign theme was:

"Vote the Man, Vote Volpe."

49

The

This, then,

is a basic element of the rational campaign strategy.

H.

Voter Turnout
Another tactic that is relevant to most campaigns is that

when faced with an incumbent, the challenger should attempt to
increase voter t u r n o u t . T h e reason for this is that it is
considered much easier to bring a new voter into the system than
it is to get an old partisan to change sides.

If the electorate

is not changed from the previous election, it is likely that changing
the result will be quite difficult.

Those people who have not voted

in the past are most likely not affiliated with any party and are
frequently indifferent to politics and, therefore, more easily
swayed by campaign appeals, if the candidate can motivate them to
turnout.

Schatt. schneider has pointed out that it has always been

true that one of the best ways to win a fight is to widen the scope
of the conflict and that ". . . the expansion of the political
community has been one of the principal means of producing change."

49

Murray Levin, The Complete Politician (New York:
Merrill Company, Inc., 1962), p. 299.

Bobbs-

50

Froman, "A Realistic Approach to Campaign Strategies
and Tactics," p. 12.
~^Niramo, The Political Persuaders, p. 25.
52

York:

E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960), p. 99.

52

21

Thus, the nonincumbent should attempt to widen the scope of the
conflict by getting as many new voters to the polls as possible.

I.

Summary
These, then, are the elements of the "rational" campaign

strategy:

candidates seek group support; concentrate their efforts

in areas of strength; emphasize policy and constituency issues and
avoid ideological and personal ones; engage in as much personal
contact as possible; employ a simple, recognizable campaign theme;
emphasize their party affiliation if a member of the majority party
and emphasize their personal characteristics if a member of the
minority party;

and if a nonincumbent,

turnout.

this discussion of theelements of a rational

After

attempt to increase the voter

campaign strategy, the following chapter deals
and methodology

with the theory

of the study.

The main idea to be examined here is that electoral races
in which inter-party competition is high promote the use of rational
campaign strategies, as defined here.

The following chapter will

attempt to elaborate this theory somewhat, to devise an index of
inter-party competition, and outline the methodology followed in
the balance of the study.

CHAPTER III
THE METHOD OF THE STUDY:

MEASURING

INTER-PARTY COMPETITION

This chapter presents the method of the study beginning with
a description of how the data are gathered and analyzed, followed by
an explanation of how the index of inter-party competition was pre
pared.

The chapter concludes xvith a brief description of the

setting, four Virginia Congressional districts that are observed.

A.

The Study
The major source of data for the study comes from direct

interviews with eight candidates in four Congressional districts in
Virginia in the 1972 House elections.

All of the candidates except

one were interviewed in the six weeks immediately preceding the
November 7 election.
middle of December.

One candidate was not available until the
The interviews were conducted, for the most

part, in the candidaters home or in his office, although two were
conducted after rallies that were held in the respective candidate's
behalf.

All of the candidates were very accommodating; the inter

views averaged about forty minutes in length.

A copy of the interview

schedule is in Appendix A and a listing of the candidates interviewed
is in Appendix B.

Also, to aid the analysis and the writer's under

standing of the various campaigns, at least one member of each
candidate's staff and one newspaper reporter from each district were
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questioned.

These responses were not quantified and were used, for t

most part, to assist the writer in determining campaign themes and th
number of personal, appearances made by the various candidates.
the interviewing was done by the writer.

All

Newspaper articles and

campaign literature were both used as additional sources of infor
mation .
The candidate responses were quantified and related to the
variable of inter-party competition.

The factor of incumbency

(incumbent or nonincumbent) was also considered when it was evident
that there was a significant relationship between it and inter
party competition.

This factor is often considered among the

most important in political campaigns with the contest taking
place between the "ins" and the "outs."
significance were used.

53

No tests of statistical

The size of the sample was too small to

warrant generalization; the results are presented in percentages.
The decision to use simple percentage tables was made for the same
reasons as Kingdon stated in his study:

large significant percentage

differences could occur in the tables, but because of the small size
of the sample would be considered statistically insignificant and,
therefore, discarded.

54

David Leuthold, Electioneering in a Democracy (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968), p. 3.
54

John Kingdon, Candidates for Office (New York:
House, 1968), p. 160.

Random
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B.

An Index of Inter-Party
Competition
Competition in politics may be described as a relationship

among those who are competing, and in the two-party system that
characterizes American politics, it is almost always the relationship
between the two major parties.

Inter-party competition, then, is

the feature of American politics studied, for the most part, by
those who wish to explore the meaning of competition in an American
setting.
Inter-party competition has been studied fairly extensively
in the political science literature of the last decade.

Of all the

variables studied in the analysis of state party politics, perhaps
the one receiving the most attention from political scientists has
been inter-party competition.

One of the most comprehensive reviews

of this literature has been done by Pfeiffer.

55

His review indicates

that four types of inter-party competition measures have been used:
pendulum effect, percentage of elections won, percentage of the vote,
and the alternation in office by the parties.

After careful analysis

of these types, Pfeiffer recommends the percentage of the vote as
being superior.

56

He states that the simplest way to use the

percentage of the vote is to compute the average margin of victory
for the winning candidate.

55

A version of this method is used by the

David Pfeiffer, "The Measurement of Inter-Party
Competition and Systemic Stability," American Political Science
Review, LXI (June, 1967), 457-67.
~^ I b i d ., p. 462.
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writer in determining the index of inter-party competition used in
this study.

The index of inter-party competition used here is the

one suggested by David of the University of Virginia. ^

He argues

that the truest test of competitiveness is simply to compute the
runner-up’s percentage of one-half the total vote, because to win
the runner-up merely has to win one vote more than 50 per cent of
the total vote.

58

This method results in a scale that has zero

for its lower limit and approaches 100 as its upper limit; the closer
to 100, the higher the level of competition.

Thus, a party that

received 45 per cent of the vote would rank at 90 on the scale
because its percentage of one-half the total vote would be 90 per
cent.

For this study, the election results for the last ten years

for the offices of Governor, United States Senator, and Congressman
were combined to arrive at an index of inter-party competition for
the four districts.

The decision to use the results from only the

last ten years (five Congressional, four Senatorial, and two
Gubernatorial) was arrived at because of the fact that changes in
Virginia politics have occurred in the recent past and it was felt
that to consider additional results would distort the realism of
the index.

The results of the index are shown in Appendix B.

Paul David, "How Can an Index of Party Competition Best
be Derived?,1' The Journal of Politics, XXXIV (May, 1972),
632-38.
CO

Ibid., p. 635.
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C.

The Sotting
The setting for the study is four Congressional districts

in Virginia, two competitive and two noncompetitive.

The four

districts include Tidewater, Virginia, parts of Northern Virginia,
and the Shenandoah Valley.

Due to redistricting, all four had

changed considerably from the 1970 election.

The First district

consists of the cities of Hampton and Newport News and several
predominately rural counties in Tidewater.

59

Of the electorate,

80 per cent live in metropolitan Hampton— Newport News.

The Second

district is totally urban, consisting of the cities of Norfolk
and Virginia Beach.

Both districts depend heavily on the military,

especially the Navy, as shipbuilding and repairing serve as the
economic base for the area.
black populations:

Both districts also have substantial

22 per cent in the First and 31 per cent in

the Second.
The Tenth district consists of much of the Virginia part
of the Washington metropolitan area:
Loudon, and northernmost Fairfax.

the counties of Arlington,

The residents are predominantly

white--only 6 per cent are black-— and have mostly middle and uppermiddle incomes.
ment payrolls.

Most depend either directly or indirectly on govern
At the conclusion of registration on October 7, 1972,

the Tenth had more potential voters than any other district in the

59

The following description of the four districts is taken
from Micheal Barone, Grant Ujifusa, and Douglas Matthews, The
Almanac of American Politics (Boston, Massachusetts: Gambit,
1972), pp". 833-55.
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state, over 240,000.^
The Seventh district includes the Shenandoah Valley of
Virginia and several counties east of the Blue Ridge Mountains.
It stretches from Virginia’s northernmost county, Frederick, south
ward nearly to Richmond, encompassing twenty-one counties and four
small cities.

Nearly 70 per cent of the district's labor force

are blue collar; much of the area is farmland with the economic
base of the district consisting mainly of the production of
livestock, poultry, and dairy products.

Blacks comprise 9 per cent

of the population; no other ethnic group has over 1 per cent.

D.

Summary
With the theoretic basis, the methodology and setting now

established, the next chapter deals with the results of the
investigation.

Do candidates from the more competitive districts

tend to employ more rational campaign strategies than their counter
parts in noncompetitive districts?

^ T h e Richmond Times-Dispatch [ Richmond, Virginia ],
October 20, 1972, Sec. B, p. 1.

CHAPTER IV
THE IMPACT OF INTER-PARTY COMPETITION
ON CAMPAIGN STRATEGY

This chapter presents the results of the investigation to
determine if rational campaign strategy and party competition are
related.

A campaign was considered rational if the candidate:
1.

makes group appeals;

2.

concentrates his time and efforts in areas of strength

rather than weakness;
3.

emphasizes policy and constituency issues rather than

ideological and personal ones;
4.

engages in as much personal contact as possible;

5.

employs a simple, recognizable campaign theme;

6.

emphasizes his party affiliation if from the majority

party and emphasizes his personal characteristics if from the minority
party; and
7.

attempts to increase the voter turnout if a non-

incumbent .
An index of inter-party competition was also prepared and is explained
in Chapter III.

Each of these seven elements of the rational campaign

strategy are considered individually.
The writer interviewed eight candidates from four Congressional
districts in Virginia.
two were noncompetitive.

Of the districts, two were competitive and
The candidates’ responses, along with
28
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information acquired from campaign aides, were quantified and related
to the factor of inter-party competition.

The results, when

possible, are shown in percentage tables.

Various examples are also

cited to help indicate the nature of the different campaign strategies
employed.

A.

Group Appeals
As mentioned in Chapter II, it is considered extremely

important that candidates seek and acquire the support of groups.
Therefore, candidates were asked, "In your campaigning, is there
any group or groups of voters that you especially make an appeal
to?M

(See Appendix A.)

Their replies suggest that the view that

candidates seek a coalition of groups sufficient to elect them is
not endorsed by all candidates.

As Table 1 indicates, three of the

four candidates in the two noncompetitive districts did not make
group appeals.

All four candidates in the competitive districts

indicated that they sought group support.
An example of a campaign in which both candidates said they
sought the support of groups occurred in the rural, competitive,
Seventh district.
of farmers.

Both candidates indicated they sought the support

Republican incumbent Robinson said that he could not

be elected without their support; the first committee his organiza
tion formed was a "Farmers for Robinson" group that engaged in mass
mailings to other farmers.

Democratic challenger Williams' campaign

literature stressed that he was a cattle farmer and understood and
cared about the problems of the farmer.

Both courted the elderly:
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TABLE 1
A CLASSIFICATION OF CANDIDATES BY DISTRICT
COMPETITIVENESS AND USE OF GROUP APPEALS
(N = 8a)

District

Appeal

Competi
tive

Noncompe
titive

Num- Per
ber cent

Num- Per
ber cent

]_( 25)

o

o

mdidates not using group appeals

o
o
t-l

:ndidates using group appeals

3 ( 75)

4 (100)

Total

4 (100)

Q

Two candidates in each of four districts.

Robinson by holding a special, well publicized, "Conference for Retired
People," and Williams by making an issue of the fact that Robinson
had voted against the bill to give Social Security recipients a
20 per cent increase in benefits.

Williams consistently stressed that

issue both in speeches and his campaign literature.

Robinson attempted

to combine these two groups with the support that he had from various
business organizations.

He was given the National Association of

Businessmen's "Watchdog of the Treasury" award.

Williams sought to

add the youth vote, especially students, to his coalition.

Both candidates in the noncompetitive First district indicated
that they avoided appeals to groups.

The incumbent, Democrat Downing,

said he sought broad-based support and made no efforts to acquire the
votes of special groups.

Perhaps the best example of this unwilling

ness to seek group support was stated by the challenger, Republican
Wells:
I'm not making any appeals to ethnic groups or any other types
of groups, in my estimation groups shouldn't be treated differently
or given special treatment. I have even turned down money from
groups who I thought would want favors in the future.
Thus, there would appear to be a tendency for candidates in
close races to actively seek the support of groups, perhaps because
of the closeness of the race they feel that they have to resort to
every tactic available.

For example, this was the explanation

offered by Democratic challenger Miller in the competitive Tenth
district:

"X court the support of these various groups for a very

simple reason.
get.

B.

I need all the manpower, money, and publicity I can

And, of course, their votes."

Area Concentration
One of the rules of rational campaigning is that candidates

should concentrate on areas in which they are thought to be strongest.
So candidates were asked whether they concentrated on voters in areas
where they thought they were strong or where they thought they were
weak.

(See Appendix B.)

As shown in Table 2, all the candidates in

competitive districts said they concentrated on areas of strength,
whereas the opposite is true of candidates in noncompetitive races.
Thus, there appears to be a strong relationship betx/een inter-party
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TABLE 2
A CLASSIFICATION OF CANDIDATES BY DISTRICT
COMPETITIVENESS AND TYPE OF AREA
CONCENTRATION
(N = 8a)

District

Competi
tive

Noncompe
titive

Num- Per
ber cent

Num- Per
ber cent

Concentration

Candidates concentrating in strong
areas

4 (100)

0 <i°0)

o<

4<

Candidates concentrating in weak
areas

Total

0)

4 (100)

Two candidates in each of four districts.

°>

4 (100)
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competition and this "rale" of campaigning.
probably that offered by Kingdon:

The best explanation is

sure winners are able to experiment

because of their safe position and sure losers likely felt they had to
concentrate in weaker areas to have any hope of broadening their
support enough to w i n . ^

On the other hand, candidates in races

where the outcome is less certain tended toward strategies that were
designed to reinforce strong areas.
Robinson's campaign director, Bill Lee, gave the following
explanation for his decision to stress strong areas:
We feel that we're just wasting our resources in going into
some areas. I'm confident we can win if we can just make all of
the people who are inclined to think like us aware of our campaign
and then get them to vote.
Another view was expressed by the Treasurer of Wells' campaign, Larry
Selman, who seemed not to be aware of this particular strategic point.
He said, "We intend to concentrate most of our efforts right at the
heart of Mr. Downing's strength."

Both Wells and Selman were involved

in their first political campaign.

C.

Issue Appeals
As mentioned in Chapter II, candidate discussion of policy

and constituency issues rather than ideological and personal issues
was considered most effective in winning votes.

To discover what issues

were discussed, the candidates were asked two questions:

which issues

have you "considered most important for your election chances," and

61

John Kingdon, Candidates for Office (New York:
House, 1968), p. 121.

Random
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which issues have been "most harmful, to your campaign."
A.)

(See Appendix

The number of issues mentioned by each candidate ran from as few

as four to as many as eight.

From their responses, we can determine

the saliency of the issues to each of the candidates.
The issues were grouped into four categories:

policy issues,

ideological issues, constituency issues, and personal issues.

The

method used to classify the issues is the same as used by Huckshorn
and Spencer in their study of the 1962 Congressional campaign:

a

policy issue emphasizes factual information, a candidate’s view on
a specific area of public policy, and usually involves some potential
or actual gain for some group or person; an ideological issue does
not emphasize factual information, is largely of a philosophical
nature, tends to simplify complex issues, and yields easily to passion,
stereotype and sloganeering; a constituency issue is a service issue,
involves case work, or a particular candidate can "do more for you” in
terms of solving individual constituent problems; a personal issue
deals with character allegations, specific to the age, personal
characteristics, personal associations, and occupation of the
62
opponent.
A distinction may be made among the four types of issues such
that a single subject area might fall into more than one category.
Constituency and personal issues are obviously different subject types,
but policy and ideological issues must be considered in the context

62

Robert Huckshorn and Robert Spencer, The Politics of
Defeat (Amherst, Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press,
1971) pp. 197-2.08.
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of how the issue is discussed.

For example, the challenger in the

First district, Wells, spoke of the issue of crime in terms of the
"moral decay of our nation" (ideological), whereas the challenger
in the Tenth district, Miller, addressed the same issue by
emphasizing that he favored increased spending for additional police
men, better police pension plans and increased salaries for policemen
(policy).
The results, as shown in Table 3, indicate that there would
seem to be a relationship between inter-party competition and candidate
choice of policy or ideological issues.

A total of fourteen issues were

mentioned in the competitive races; fourteen were also mentioned in the
noncompetitive races.

Candidates in competitive districts emphasized

policy issues over ideological ones by a margin of six-to-one; candi
dates in noncompetitive districts chose ideological issues by nearly
two-to-one.

The most ideological oriented campaign was that of Wells

in the noncompetitive First district.
Wells offered the voters an
flag campaign."

63

A newspaper report said that

. . applie pie, motherhood and the

Wells said that he wanted his campaign to

". . . project a program of constitutional government, fiscal
responsibility and patriotic dedication to country."

He appealed

to the ". . . patriotic and religious instincts of Americans."
As Table 4 indicates, there does not seem to be a significant
association between party competition and candidate choice of personal

The Richmond Tlmes-Dispatch [ Richmond, Virginia ],
October 1.0, 1972, Sec. B, p. 4.
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TABLE 3
ISSUE EMPHASIS AND INTER-PARTY COMPETITION:
POLICY AND IDEOLOGICAL ISSUES IN
COMPETITIVE AND NONCOMPETITIVE
DISTRICTS
(N = 28)

District

Competitive

Noncompetitive

Num- Per
ber cent

Num- Per
ber cent

12< 85.7)

5 ( 35.5)

2 ( 14.3)

9( 64.5)

14(100.0)

14(ioo.o)

Issue

Policy issues emphasized
Ideological issues emphasized

Total
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TABLE 4
ISSUE EMPHASIS AND INTER-PARTY COMPETITION:
CONSTITUENCY AND PERSONAL ISSUES IN
COMPETITIVE AND NONCOMPETITIVE
DISTRICTS
(N = 18)

District

Competi
tive

Noncompe
titive

Num- Per
ber cent

Num- Per
ber cent

Issue

Constituency issues emphasized
Personal issues emphasized

4 ( 40)

4 <

6 ( 60)

50>

I

o
o

I—

o

r— 1

o
o

00

1— I

Total

or constituency issues.

4 < 50)

In fact, the campaign with the most emphasis

on the personality of the candidate and the most name-calling was in
the competitive Tenth district.

Incumbent Republican Broyhill seldom

referred to his opponent, Miller, but when he did it was in terms
of "some demagogue or hypocrite."

64

Broyhill referred to Senator

Edward Kennedy as "Chappaquiddick T e d d y . K e n n e d y had endorsed

64

The Washington Post [ Washington, D. C. ], October 20, 1972,
Sec. B , p . 1.
^ I b i d ., p . 7 .
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Miller during the campaign and helped raise funds for the challenger.
Miller cited the number one issue in the campaign as Broyhill's many
"personal conflicts of interest."
The factor of incumbency does appear to be associated with
these issues:

incumbents emphasized 75 per cent of the constituency

issues in both competitive and noncompetitive races; nonincumbents
chose 70 per cent of the personal issues.

Incumbents appeared to

choose a strategy designed to make themselves appear to be above
the partisan battle.

They avoided personal attacks on their

opponents (usually ignoring them) and stressed their efforts at
constituent service.

D.

Personal Contact
The amount of personal contact a candidate engages in is an

important aspect of his campaign strategy.

Most candidates believe

that the more personal his communication with voters, the more effective
he is likely to be.
One way of measuring how much personal contact candidates have
with the electorate is to determine how many days they actually
spent campaigning.^

Candidates in competitive districts tended to

campaign more than those in noncompetitive districts as Table 5
indicates.

They averaged 86 days campaigning; noncompetitive candi

dates averaged 61 days.
104 days.

Incumbents averaged 39 days and nonincumbents,

Much of this difference between incumbents and nonincumbents

David Leuthold, Electioneering in a Democracy (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968), p. 103.
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is due to the length of the Congressional session, which kept incum
bents in Washington until the middle of October.

Also, to determine

the amount of personal contact, campaign aides were asked to estimate
how many times their candidate appeared before any sort of organized
gathering of voters.

Here, again, competitive candidates engaged in

more personal contact as Table 6 indicates.

E.

Theme
As indicated in Chapter II, a short and easily recognizable

theme is an important part of a political campaign.

By reading

campaign literature and by interviewing campaign aides, one was
able to determine if each campaign had a short, recognizable campaign
theme.

As Table 7 indicates, all the candidates in competitive

districts had a discernible theme.

The two who did not in the

noncompetitive districts were both nonincumbents.

Good examples

of short themes were the Broyhill and Downing themes.

The Broyhill

theme, "Twenty Years of Effective Leadership,” was designed to
capitalize on the candidate's vast experience and record of service
to his constituents.

The Downing theme, "This Man Is Your Man," was

also designed to capitalize on the fact that Downing had spent
fourteen years as the First district's "man in Washington."
It is interesting also that when asked if they thought
having a theme is of any importance in political campaigning, all
four candidates in competitive races said yes.

Of the four in

noncompetitive races, three answered negatively or said that they felt
that its importance was overrated by professional political managers.
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TABLE 5
AVERAGE NUMBER OF DAYS SPENT CAMPAIGNING
BY CANDIDATES IN COMPETITIVE AND
NONCOMPETITIVE DISTRICTS

District
Days Campaigning
Competitive

Average days per candidate

Noncompetitive

86

61

TABLE 6
AVERAGE NUMBER OF PERSONAL APPEARANCES BY
CANDIDATES IN COMPETITIVE AND
NONCOMPETITIVE DISTRICTS

District
Personal Appearances
Competitive

Average days per candidate

55

Noncompetitive

30
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TABLE 7
A CLASSIFICATION OF CANDIDATES BY DISTRICT
COMPETITIVENESS AND TYPE OF THEME USED
(N = 8a)

District

Competi
tive

Noncompe
titive

Num- Per
ber cent

Num- Per
ber cent

Theme

Candidates using short, discernible
r—1

o
o

theme

2 < 50)

Candidates using no discernible

0<

theme

°>

4 (100)

Total

2 ( 50)

4 (100)

g
Two candidates in each of four districts.

Thus, there seems to be a tendency for candidates in competitive races
both to have themes and to acknowledge their importance.

F.

Party-Personality
One of the longstanding rules of campaign strategy is that

candidates from the

majority party should emphasize their party label

and play down their

personal characteristics.

candidates from the

minority party.

To determine if this

The reverse

rule was followed, candidates

is true of

wereasked

whether they emphasized their personal characteristics or their par
affiliation during the campaign.

(See Appendix A.)

All eight

candidates responded that they stressed their own personal
attributes over their party.

Also, the four Democrats indicated

that they were not anxious to have themselves linked to the
national McGovern-Shriver ticket, which they preceived as being
unpopular in Virginia in 1972.

In this setting, there was no

relationship between inter-party competition and this particular
element of campaign strategy.
There is evidence that the American electorate has
grown distrustful of their political parties and may be
losing their habit of partisanship.8^

A survey by M. Johnson

and Broder in 1970 indicated that ". . . not only are voters
splitting their tickets and moving back and forth from election to
election, but their perception of party differences is growing
visibly w e a k e r . I f

this trend continues, perhaps the most

"rational" course for a candidate to follow is to deemphasize his
party affiliation even if he is from the majority party.

G•

V o r Turnout
Another rule of good campaigning is that nonincumbents,

the challengers, should make a determined effort to increase voter
turnout.

A recent study of registration and voting has indicated
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and Row, 1972), p. 251.
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that there is a very close relationship between the number of people
registered to vote and the actual voter turnout on election day.
The relationship was almost one to one:

69

if City A had 1 per cent

higher registration than City B, then voter turnout on the average
was 1 per cent higher in City A . ^

Therefore, one way to determine

if a candidate seriously attempts to increase turnout is to see how
much emphasis he placed on registration.

The four nonincumbents

were asked how much emphasis they placed on registration drives:
considerable, fair amount, or none.

(See Appendix A.)

The candi

dates in competitive races answered considerable; the noncompetitive
candidate replied none.

The reason cited by both sure losers for

their nonemphasis was that they lacked the money and the organiza
tion to do so.

The challenger in the competitive Tenth district,

Miller, placed the most emphasis on increasing voter turnout,
especially young voters.

He had representatives on every major

college campus in the state, whose job was to get students from the
Tenth district properly registered so they could vote by absentee
ballot.

He indicated that his campaign ’’dedicated the entire month o

September to getting people registered.”

Thus, there would seem to

be an association between challengers ’ efforts to increase voter
turnout and inter-party competition (see Table 8).
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Stanley Kelley, Richard Ayres, and William Bowen,
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TABLE 8
A CLASSIFICATION OF CHALLENGERS BY DISTRICT
COMPETITIVENESS AND AMOUNT OF EMPHASIS
ON TURNOUT
(N = 4a)

District

Competitive

Noncompetitive

Num- Per
ber cent

Num- Per
ber cent

Emphasis on Turnout

Candidates with considerable
emphasis on turnout

2 (100)

0(

0)

o

O
O

of emphasis on turnout

o

Candidates with a fair amount

Candidates with no emphasis on
rv
O

Total

V/
O

turnout

2 (100)

2 (100)

2 (100)

aOne candidate in each of four districts.
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H.

Summary
Nearly all the elements of a "rational" campaign strategy

appear to be associated with the variable of inter-party competition.
The questions of group appeals, area concentration, issue appeals
(policy-ideological), personal contact, theme, and turnout are related
to inter-party competition.

Only the questions of party-personality

and candidate choice of personal or constituency issues do not seem
to be related to party competition.

In the concluding chapter,

there is a summary of the results and a look at the possible implica
tions of the findings of this investigation.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this investigation has been to observe the
association between inter-party competition and the campaign strategies
employed by various Congressional candidates.

Both of these variables

are important elements in the American political process.

In fact,

as previously mentioned, the factor of competition can be considered
essential for democracy.

And, the amount of real competition in

election campaigns is n. . . an important measure of the meaning
fulness of any democracy."^
The campaigns in four Congressional districts in Virginia
were observed during the 1972 election campaign.

Two of the

districts were competitive and two were noncompetitive.

Most of

the data for the study came from direct interviews with the eight
candidates in the four races.

Campaign aides and one newsman from

each district were also questioned.

Thus, the study is limited

because of the number of campaigns that were observed.

Also, the

results may be applicable only to areas such as Virginia where party
politics have been in a state of flux in recent years.
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The hypothesis of the study is that candidates in competitive
races conduct more "rational" campaign strategies than their counter
parts in noncompetitive races.
if the candidate:

A strategy is considered "rational"

makes group appeals; emphasizes policy and

constituency issues rather than ideological and personal ones;
concentrates his time and efforts in areas of strength rather than
weakness; engages in as much personal contact as possible; employs a
simple, recognizable campaign theme; emphasizes his party affiliation
if from the majority party and emphasizes his personal characteristics
if from the minority party; and attempts to increase the voter turnout
if a nonincumbent.
hypothesis.

The results of this investigation confirmed the

Candidates in competitive races did conduct, for the

most part, more "rational" strategies; only the questions of
party or personality emphasis and candidate choice of personal or
constituency issues do not seem to be related with inter-party
competition.
There appears to be a reasonable explanation for the fact
that all the candidates chose to emphasize their personal characteris
tics over their party affiliation.

As previously stated, recent

evidence indicates that the American electorate is steadily losing
its habit of partisanship.
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Also, the two major parties have not

exhibited that much strength in Virginia elections in recent years;
independents won the state-wide races in both 1970 and 1971.
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times they defeated candidates from the two major parties.

Thus, it

seems that candidates have deemed it more "rational" not to emphasize
their party affiliation even if their party is in the majority.
Also, there was no important relationship between party
competition and candidate choice of constituency or personal issues.
Incumbents emphasized most of the constituency issues; nonincumbents
most of the personal issues.

It is logical for incumbents, who

have a record of constituent service, to stress their previous
service.

Perhaps, however, it is incorrect to state that nonincumbents

to be "rational" also have to emphasize constituency issues:

they

have no previous service and to bring this to the attention of the
voter only aids the incumbent.

It may be that nonincumbents are

forced to use personal issues to get recognition both from the media
and the electorate and therefore find it more useful to emphasize
personal issues rather than constituency issues.
Candidates in competitive races sought the support of groups
among the electorate and also concentrated their campaign activities
in areas of perceived strength.

Candidates in noncompetitive races

did not adhere to these two strategic rules of campaigning.

Campaigns

in noncompetitive races were more ideologically oriented than those
in competitive races.

Candidates in competitive districts stressed

policy issues; candidates in noncompetitive districts emphasized
ideological issues.

Candidates in noncompetitive races were also

less likely to follow some of the other points that Froman considered
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in a realistic campaign strategy.
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They engaged in less personal

contact; were more likely not to have a campaign theme; and if a
nonincumbent, made less of an effort to enlarge the turnout.
Therefore, at least in the campaigns studied, competition tended to
be related to rationality in decision making by candidates.

Kingdon

also found that candidates in noncompetitive races adopted ". . .
plans that are less than efficient for gaining support."
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The

explanation may be that sure winners, confident of victory, do not
attempt to simply add to their support but also attempt to engage
in a campaign to "educate" others.

On the other hand, the sure

losers, fairly certain of their defeat, may decide to "speak their
minds” instead of trying to broaden their base of support.
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Besides rationality in decision making, there would seem
to be other beneficial aspects of campaigning in competitive districts
With candidate emphasis on policy issues and not ideological issues,
campaigns in competitive districts are

. . perhaps the ideal in

popular concept of the democratic electoral process."

77

By exchanging

views on specific areas of public policy, candidates are engaged in a
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very desirable method of informing the electorate.

In fact, representa

tive democracy may be defined in terms of the access of voters to
issues of public policy, how these issues are discussed and the choices
that are provided among the candidates.

Also, there is evidence that

candidates in competitive races are more accurately informed about
voter opinions than candidates in noncompetitive races.
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It is more

likely, then, that their Congressional votes and actions will be more
representative than the votes and actions of candidates from noncompetitive districts.
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The importance of competition is also indicated by the
evidence gathered concerning political participation, a concept
frequently used to measure the usefulness of democracy.

Candidates

in competitive races made a much greater effort to increase voter
turnout.

They spent money and considerable time in efforts to

register new voters.

They also engaged in a great deal more personal

contact than candidates in noncompetitive races.

They campaigned

an average of twenty-five more days and also made nearly twice as
many personal appearances as noncompetitive candidates.

Thus, voters

in competitive districts were more likely to be visited by a candidate
or hear a campaign speech and therefore, at least to that extent, be
involved in the political process.
In addition, it may be that competitive candidates by using
short campaign themes serve an educational function.
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have only a short attention span and limited retention; therefore, it
is likely that brief, easily recognizable campaign themes are useful
in that they make it easier for those voters to understand the
political debate.
Evidence has mounted recently that perhaps the amount of
party competition is not as essential to democracy as previously
was believed.
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For example, a study of welfare politics indicated

that welfare payments were not related to party competition as much
as they were related to other factors such as per capita income
. ,,
81
and various other economic variables.
However, this study does not reach the same conclusion as
these recent investigations have.

The findings of this investigation

indicate that increased party competition is associated with variables
considered important to democracy.

Rationality in candidate decision

increased as the amount of party competition increased.

As competition

increased, so did the amount of political participation, a concept
that can be used to measure the usefulness of democracy.
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Candidates

in competitive districts engaged in a more meaningful discussion of
issues, also considered ideal for democracy.
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Candidates in
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competitive races also made greater efforts to educate the electorate.
Thus, the results of this investigation seriously question the
conclusion reached by various scholars in recent years that increased
party competition is not essential to democracy.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

CANDIDATE QUESTIONNAIRE

1.

When you began your campaign, how certain were you of the eventual
election outcome?

2. Why did you feel this way?
3. During your campaign, is there any group or groups of voters that
you especially make an appeal to?
a.

If yes, which ones?

b.

If no, what is your overall campaign plan?

4.

How have you attempted to win their support?

5.

Have any groups endorsed your candidacy?

6.

How important do you think these groups are in terms of your
election chances?

7.

Do you concentrate your efforts on voters in areas where you
think you will do well, or where you think you'll run poorly, or
what ?

8.

Since you began your campaign, how many days have you spent
actually campaigning in your district?
a.

How important is it that candidates get out and mix with
the people?

9.

How much emphasis have you placed on registration drives?
a.

Considerable.

b.

A fair amount.
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c.
10.

Would a large turnout aid you or your opponent?
a.

11.

Why?

Do you think your campaign has developed any particular theme?
a.

12.

None.

If so, what?

Do you feel that having a theme is of any importance in a
political campaign?

13.

Which of the following three factors would you say is most
important in determining the choice of the voters?
a.

Party label.

b.

Issues of the campaign.

c.

Personal characteristics of the candidates.

14.

Which have you emphasized most?

15.

Turning to issues, which ones have you considered most important
for your election chances?

16.

Why have these been so important?

17.

Which ones have been most harmful to your campaign?

18.

How have you presented your i.ssues--did you deal generally with
them or did you treat them in a more detailed fashion?

19.

Do you think your method of presentation has had any effect on
your election chances?

20.

How important is it to you that you be elected, or are there
other considerations that enter into your choices?

21.

Finally, is there anything else about your campaign that you would
like to add?

APPENDIX B

LIST OF CANDIDATES INTERVIEWED

District

Incumbent

Challenger

Tenth

Joel Broyhill
Republican

Harold Miller
Democrat

Seventh

J. Kenneth Robinson
Republican

Murat Williams
Democrat

Second

William Whitehurst
Republican

Charles Burlage
Democrat

First

Thomas Downing
Democrat

Kenneth WTells
Republican
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APPENDIX C

INDEX OF INTER-PARTY COMPETITION

As mentioned in Chapter III, the method used to determine this
index is the one suggested by David.

84

The election results from the

last ten years for the offices of Governor, Senator, and Congressman
in the four districts were compiled to determine the runner-up party's
percentage of one-half the total vote.

This resulted in a scale

ranging from 0 to 100; the higher the ranking, the greater the level
of competition.

It was felt that if a district ranked 80 or better

(the runner-up party averaged over 40 per cent of the vote), it would
be considered competitive.

Leuthold, in his analysis of Congressional

campaigns in California, also considered candidates who received 40to 60-per cent of the vote to be in competitive races.

85

Also,

incumbents falling in this range are frequently targets for special
efforts by opponents because of the margin of their previous
victory.^

This increases the likelihood that the campaigns will

be competitive.

The results of the index are shown in Table 9.
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TABLE 9
THE RESULTS OF THE INDEX OF INTER-PARTY
COMPETITION

Runner-up's Percentage of Onehalf the Total of both Votes
District

Competition
Con
gress
man

Sen
ator

Gover
nor

Tenth

88.6

64.6

96.8

83.3

Competitive

Seventh

89.2

62.2

98.4

83.2

Competitive

Second

53.8

58.2

88.2

73.4

Noncompetitive

First

28.6

56.4

91.4

58.7

Noncompetitive

Aver
age
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